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Abstract
Over the past decade there has been an increasing number of disputes concerning
the enforcement and licensing of patents covering technical standards. These disputes
have taken on a global character and often involve litigation in North America, Europe
and Asia. And while many of the parties are the same in actions around the world, courts
and governmental agencies in different jurisdictions have begun to develop distinctive
approaches to some of these issues. Thus, while areas of convergence exist, national
laws differ on important issues including the availability of injunctive relief for FRANDencumbered SEPs, the appropriate method for calculating FRAND royalties, the
competition implications of violating a FRAND commitment, and the contours of the
FRAND non-discrimination obligation. Thus, at least until greater international
harmonization is achieved, firms doing business globally must remain particularly
attuned to the evolving legal landscape in this area. This paper presents a brief overview
of recent disputes that have arisen around the world with respect to the acquisition,
enforcement and licensing of patents that are essential to technical interoperability
standards. It is intended as an introduction and covers only the highlights of many
complex and controversial subjects. The reader who wishes to obtain a more
comprehensive treatment of the topics covered in this paper is referred to the additional
references listed in the Appendix.
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I.

Standards, Standardization and Patents

Technical interoperability standards affect all aspects of the modern networked
economy. Every smartphone, laptop, and digital file, along with thousands of other hightech and low-tech products, depends on standards to operate within a network of devices
sold by thousands of different vendors. The existence of these standards, and the
widespread product interoperability that they enable, give rise to significant market
efficiencies known as “network effects.” It is widely acknowledged that standards can
increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice; foster public health and safety; and
enable efficient and reliable international trade.3
Most of the thousands of technical standards currently deployed throughout the
world were developed collaboratively by market participants in voluntary standardsdevelopment organizations (SDOs).4 SDOs range from officially recognized bodies that
address a diverse range of standardization projects (e.g., the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO)), to large, well-established private sector groups that address
the standardization needs of major industry segments (e.g., the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
and Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)) to smaller groups often
referred to as “consortia” that focus on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the
HDMI Forum, Bluetooth Special Interest Group, USB Forum). Because of the
significant market benefits that are made possible by technical standards, a high degree of
cooperation among competitors has long been tolerated by antitrust and competition law
authorities, which might otherwise discourage such large-scale coordination efforts
among competitors.5
Many of the technological features specified by standards can be patented. Such
patents are typically obtained by those participants in a standardization activity that make
technical contributions to the standard (SDOs themselves almost never obtain patent
protection over their standards). However, to the extent that patents cover technologies
that are “essential” to the implementation of a standard (“standards-essential patents” or
“SEPs”), concerns can arise.
Ordinarily, if the manufacturer of a product that allegedly infringes a patent is
unable, or does not wish, to obtain a license on the terms offered by the patent holder,
that manufacturer has three choices: to stop selling the infringing product, to design
around the patent, or do neither and risk liability as an infringer. With standardized
products, however, the manufacturer’s choices are more limited, as designing around the
patent may be impossible or may make the product non-compliant with the standard (e.g.,
who would sell a smartphone today without Wi-Fi capability?). Moreover, once a
3

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC
ANTITRUST & IPR].
4
So-called de facto standards, which are developed by a single company and later gain market
acceptance, are not addressed by this paper.
5
DOJ/FTC Antitrust & IPR, p. 33.
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standard is approved and released by an SDO, manufacturers may make significant
internal investments on the basis of the standard. In such cases, the cost of switching
from the standardized technology to an alternative technology may be prohibitive (a
situation often referred to as “lock-in”). Once manufacturers are locked into a particular
standardized technology, the holders of SEPs covering that technology may be able to
extract fees from them that exceed the value of their patented technology, simply because
the manufacturer is unable to switch to an alternative technology without incurring
substantial costs. This phenomenon has been termed patent “hold-up” and is discussed
extensively in the literature. In addition to harming potential competitors, patent hold-up
can have other undesirable market effects, including raising prices for consumers and
hindering technological innovation.
The risk of hold-up is likely to increase as the number of parties holding SEPs
that cover a single standard rises. Complex technological products may implement
dozens, if not hundreds of standards, each of which may be covered by hundreds or
thousands of patents held be a wide range of parties. As such, the aggregation of royalty
demands by multiple patent holders could lead to cost-prohibitive burdens on
implementing standards-compliant products. This situation is sometimes referred to as
“royalty stacking”. Royalty stacking can arise “when a standard implicates numerous
patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands,” each of which bears a royalty that must be
paid by product manufacturers and which “may become excessive in the aggregate.”6
In order to mitigate the threats of patent hold-up and royalty stacking, many SDOs
have adopted internal policies that are binding on their participants. These policies fall
into two general categories: disclosure policies and licensing policies. Disclosure policies
require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that they hold, generally prior to the approval
of a relevant standard. These disclosures are often made available to the public via the
Internet.7 Early disclosure of SEPs enables standards developers to decide whether or not
to approve a design that is covered by these SEPS, to choose an alternative, noninfringing technology, to modify a draft standard before it is approved to eliminate the
infringing feature, or to seek licenses to the patented technology.
Licensing policies, on the other hand, require SEP holders to grant manufacturers
of standardized products licenses to use their SEPs on terms that are either royalty-free
(RF) or “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). These commitments are
intended to assure product manufacturers that they will be able to obtain all SEP licenses
necessary to manufacture a standardized product. FRAND or RF licensing commitments
are required of all SDOs accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and are also utilized widely among other SDOs around the world.

6

Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
For example, IETF (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/), ETSI (https://ipr.etsi.org), and ISO
(https://www.iso.org/iso-standards-and-patents.html) all have publicly-accessible online databases
containing SEP disclosures by their participants.
7
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Despite the appeal of FRAND commitments, a consistent, practical, and readily
enforceable definition of FRAND has proven difficult to achieve.8 Virtually no SDO
defines precisely what this phrase means, and many SDOs, including IEEE and IETF,
affirmatively disclaim any role in establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating the
reasonableness of FRAND licensing terms. In fact, some SDOs go so far as to prohibit
discussions of royalties and other licensing terms at SDO meetings, making the
development of a consensus view difficult. Such ambiguity, it is argued, may permit
opportunistic SEP holders to insist on licensing terms, particularly royalty rates, that are
not bounded by meaningful limitations. This lack of certainty has contributed to the
litigation over FRAND commitments. Such disputes have arisen when a SEP holder and
a product manufacturer cannot agree on the terms of a license and there is disagreement
whether the patent holder’s proposed royalty is “reasonable.” However, FRAND disputes
can also involve the reasonableness of non-royalty terms, such as requirements that the
vendor license-back its own patents to the patent holder (“reciprocity”) or that the license
be “suspended” if the manufacturer threatens the patent holder with litigation (“defensive
suspension”). When parties cannot agree on license terms, no license is granted and any
product that conforms to a standard may infringe the patent holder’s SEPs. The parties
are thus left in a difficult and ambiguous situation, which has led to a vigorous debate
within industry, government, and academia regarding the scope and contour of FRAND
obligations. Some of the specific issues in dispute are discussed in the following sections.

II.

Injunctive Relief and Standards Essential Patents

An injunction is a judicial remedy under which certain actions can be prohibited
through the power of the court. In the case of patents, an injunction is typically sought by
a patent holder in order to prevent an infringer from continuing to make, use or sell
infringing goods or services. Injunctive relief is available in one form or another in most
developed countries.

A. Injunctions in the United States
1. The eBay Framework
The analysis of injunctive relief in U.S. patent cases takes its current form from
the 2006 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.9 In
eBay the Supreme Court held that the decision to grant or deny an injunction is an act of
judicial discretion that must be exercised in accordance with “well-established principles
of equity” (p. 391). The Court articulated a four-factor equitable test to be applied by
courts considering the grant of injunctive relief. This test requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate:

8

The remainder of this discussion will focus on FRAND commitments, as the interpretation of RF
commitments is significantly less controversial.
9
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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1. that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
2. that remedies available at law [i.e., monetary damages] are inadequate to
compensate it for that injury;
3. that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
4. that the public interest would not be disserved by the award of an
injunction.
In view of these factors, some commentators and litigants in the U.S. have argued
that a SEP holder, by making a FRAND commitment, implicitly concedes that remedies
available at law (i.e., monetary damages) must be adequate to compensate it for the
infringement of its SEPs by parties implementing a standard. They reason that, by
committing to grant a license on FRAND terms, the SEP holder has agreed not to exclude
others from the market, but will instead collect only a “reasonable” royalty to compensate
it for the infringement of its SEPs. As a result, they argue that the second eBay factor can
never be satisfied by a patent holder that has made a FRAND commitment, and therefor
such a patent holder should generally be precluded from seeking injunctive relief to
prevent others from operating under its SEPs. The interplay of FRAND commitments
with the U.S. law of patent injunctions has given rise to several judicial decisions as well
as guidance from regulatory and enforcement agencies in the U.S.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,10 Motorola sought an injunction to prevent
Microsoft’s continued infringement of Motorola’s patents covering two industry
standards (IEEE’s 802.11 and ITU’s H.264) as to which Motorola made FRAND
commitments. The court evaluated Motorola’s request for an injunction in view of the
four eBay factors and determined that Motorola did not suffer an irreparable injury or
show that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate it for the infringement.
Accordingly, the court denied Motorola’s request for an injunction.
In Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.,11 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California held that a SEP holder breached its FRAND commitment
by seeking injunctive relief against an implementer of a standard before the patent holder
offered a license to the implementer. Again, the injunction was denied.
These district court decisions laid the groundwork for the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to consider the issue of injunctive relief in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc..12
In this case, the trial court denied Motorola’s motion for an injunction on SEPs allegedly
infringed by Apple’s products. In rejecting Motorola’s arguments, the trial court
reasoned that a patent holder making a FRAND commitment, by definition,
acknowledges that a monetary royalty is adequate compensation, thereby eliminating any
argument that the infringement would cause the patent holder irreparable harm.

10

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170587 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
946 F. Supp.2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
12
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
11
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Judge Reyna, writing for the Federal Circuit, upheld the denial of the injunction,
but offered different reasoning. Though the Federal Circuit panel was divided on some
issues, all three members of the panel concurred that “[t]o the extent that the district court
applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred” (p. 1331). The
court reasoned that the eBay framework “provides ample strength and flexibility for
analyzing []RAND committed patents and industry standards in general”, and found no
reason to create “a separate rule or analytical framework for addressing injunctions for
[]RAND-committed patents” (pp. 1331-32). The court acknowledged that under the eBay
framework, “a patentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing
irreparable harm” (p. 1332). However, “an injunction may be justified where an infringer
unilaterally refuses a []RAND royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same
effect” (id.). With this in mind, the court went on to apply the eBay “irreparable harm”
test and rejected Motorola’s request for an injunction.
Chief Judge Rader, dissenting-in-part, argued that a genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding Apple’s conduct with respect to the acceptance of a FRAND license
from Motorola (i.e., did Apple act in good faith or “hold out” by refusing to accept a
FRAND license). Accordingly, Judge Rader would have remanded the case for further
fact finding on this issue (pp. 1333-34). Judge Prost, on the other hand, concurring-inpart and dissenting-in-part, disagreed with the majority’s suggestion that an alleged
infringer’s refusal to negotiate a license could serve as a basis for issuing an injunction on
a FRAND-encumbered patent (p. 1342). She reasoned that while a potential licensee’s
bad faith negotiation might justify an award of enhanced damages, the eBay “irreparable
harm” test would nevertheless weigh against granting an injunction on a FRANDencumbered patent (id.). However, Judge Prost conceded that an injunction might be
appropriate if the patentee were unable to collect the damages to which it is entitled, for
example, if the potential licensee refuses to pay an adjudicated damage award or is
beyond the reach of the court (p. 1343).
2. The ITC and Patent Exclusion Orders
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent federal agency
responsible for protecting U.S. commerce by barring the importation of infringing goods.
In recent years, the ITC has become a popular venue for patent infringement suits. The
ITC has no authority to award monetary damages. The principal remedy that the ITC
awards is an exclusion order, which prohibits goods that are found to infringe a U.S.
intellectual property right from entering the country.13 In this sense, exclusion orders
granted by the ITC are similar to injunctions issued by U.S. courts.
But because the ITC is not a court, it is not bound by Supreme Court precedent.
Thus, the ITC is not required to adhere to the eBay factors when considering a request for
an exclusion order. However, in considering whether to grant an exclusion order, the
ITC is required by its own governing statute to consider “the effect of such exclusion
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy,
13

19 U.S.C. §337(a)(1)(A).

Jorge Contreras

7

Global Standards Wars

the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers”. 14 This requirement has generally been referred to as the ITC’s “public
interest” test.
In several recent cases, the ITC has considered requests for exclusion orders
against products infringing one or more FRAND-committed SEPs. In the dispute between
Apple and Samsung,15 the ITC issued an exclusion order in 2013 prohibiting Apple from
importing devices infringing certain Samsung FRAND-committed SEPs into the U.S. But
in response, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), acting on behalf of the Obama
administration, disapproved (thereby reversing) the ITC’s exclusion order against Apple,
reasoning that the ITC did not act on the basis of a sufficient factual record regarding,
inter alia, “information on the standards essential nature of the patent at issue … and the
presence or absence of patent hold-up or reverse hold-up”.16 The USTR’s disapproval of
the ITC’s exclusion order against Apple took many by surprise. In subsequent cases, the
ITC has more extensively considered factors relating to SEPs when conducting its public
interest analysis.17
Several other U.S. federal agencies have expressed views regarding the ITC’s
issuance of exclusion orders for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. In 2013, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a joint
Policy Statement relating to the consideration of the pubic interest with respect to ITC
exclusion orders.18 It states that “the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order may be
inconsistent with the public interest … where an exclusion order based on a F/RANDencumbered patent appears to be incompatible with the terms of a patent holder’s existing
F/RAND licensing commitment” (p. 6). In this Policy Statement, the DOJ and PTO
acknowledge circumstances in which an injunction or exclusion order may be an
appropriate remedy. These include cases in which the infringer refuses to accept the
FRAND license being offered, refuses to pay a reasonable royalty, refuses to engage in
negotiation to determine FRAND terms, or is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court that
could award damages.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has made similar arguments regarding
the circumstances under which the public interest would be served by the issuance of an
ITC exclusion order against a product infringing a FRAND-committed SEP. In a written
Statement to the ITC,19 the FTC reasoned that the ITC’s public interest factors “support
14

19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
In re Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music
and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-794
16
Letter from Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, U.S. Trade Representative to Hon. Irving A.
Williamson, Aug. 3, 2013.
17
Such cases include In re Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and
Components Thereof, ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-868 (Jun. 13, 2014) (relating to Interdigital).
18
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (DOJ-PTO). 2013. Policy Statement on
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments.
19
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Third Party U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Statement
of the Public Interest on In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable
Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 at 5 (Jun. 6,
2012).
15
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denial of an exclusion order unless the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has made a
reasonable royalty offer” (p. 4). The FTC has also suggested that the ITC should consider
ways to lessen the impact of exclusion orders in a manner that is supportive of the public
interest. Such methods might include delaying the effectiveness of exclusion orders in
order to give the infringer time to design around the asserted patent, and carefully
circumscribing the scope of orders to cover only infringing articles.
3. Injunctions and U.S. Antitrust Agencies
The DOJ and FTC have each taken an interest in the propriety of parties bound by
FRAND commitments seeking injunctive relief. In 2011, the FTC suggested that under
eBay, injunctive relief might not always be justified in the FRAND context, writing that
“[a] prior [F]RAND commitment can provide strong evidence that denial of the
injunction and ongoing royalties will not irreparably harm the patentee”.20 And in 2012,
the DOJ approved three large patent acquisition transactions only after the involved
parties (Apple, Google, and Microsoft) committed not to seek injunctions preventing the
use of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.
In late 2012 and 2013, the FTC brought two actions under Section 5 of the FTC
Act to address suspected violations of FRAND commitments. In the first such action, the
FTC investigated Robert Bosch GmbH in connection with its proposed acquisition of a
firm called SPX.21 According to the complaint, SPX participated in an SDO developing
standards for automotive cooling systems. Despite having made a FRAND commitment
to the SDO, SPX asserted two patents covering the SDO’s standards against suspected
infringers and then sought injunctive relief to prevent future sales of infringing products.
The FTC argued that SPX’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief in the face of its FRAND
commitment was coercive, and thereby constituted an unfair method of competition in
violation of the Act. Bosch settled the action by committing that SPX would no longer
seek injunctive relief in this context.
The second such action was brought against Motorola Mobility and Google.22 In
that case, Motorola (later acquired by Google) held patents essential to practice standards
promulgated by IEEE, ITU, and ETSI. Motorola participated in, and made FRAND
commitments to, each of these SDOs. Nevertheless, in separate suits asserting these
patents against Apple and Microsoft, Motorola sought exclusion orders at the ITC and
injunctions in federal court to prevent future sales of standards-compliant products, even
though both defendants were allegedly willing to acquire licenses to Motorola’s patents.
The FTC asserted that Motorola’s attempt to enjoin sales of Apple and Microsoft
products using its standards-essential patents constituted an unfair method of competition
in violation of Section 5. The dispute was settled after Google agreed not to seek
injunctive relief against an infringer of FRAND-committed patents unless the infringer
was beyond the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, stated in writing that it would not accept a
20
Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with
Competition 235 (2011).
21
Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013).
22
In re. Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4410 (Jul. 23, 2013) (decision
and order.
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license of the patent, refused to enter into a license agreement determined by a court or
arbitrator to comply with the FRAND requirement, or failed to provide written
confirmation of an offer of a FRAND license.
Despite these actions, there are signs that the Department of Justice in the Trump
Administration may have a different view regarding injunctions and FRANDencumbered SEPs. In a recent speech, the head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division was
critical of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple v. Motorola, and expressed skepticism
in general about the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders.23

B.

Injunctive Relief and FRAND in Europe: Huawei v. ZTE

Under the national laws of many European countries, Germany in particular,
injunctions are issued as a matter of right once a property owner (i.e., a patent holder)
establishes an infringement of its property right. However, this strong presumption in
favor of injunctions is offset by the effect of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. In
some cases, dominance may be conferred by patent rights, and SEPs in particular. Thus,
it is possible that a patent holder’s otherwise valid attempt to obtain an injunction against
a product manufacturer could constitute a violation of Article 102 if the asserted patent is
a FRAND-encumbered SEP.
The analytical framework for assessing abuse of dominance with SEPs subject to
FRAND commitments was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Huawei
v. ZTE.24 In Huawei, the SEP holder sought an injunction against an infringer. The ECJ
held that if a SEP holder possesses market dominance, then in order to avoid violating
Article 102, the SEP holder must comply with a series of procedural steps. Likewise, in
order to preserve its ability to challenge the SEP holder’s behavior under Article 102, the
infringer must comply with a similar series of procedural steps. The combination of
these behavioral requirements has been referred to as the Huawei “choreography”. The
required steps in this choreography are summarized below:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

patentee must notify the defendant of the alleged infringement;
defendant must show its willingness to license on FRAND terms;
patentee must make a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms;
defendant must diligently respond to that offer without delaying tactics;
If defendant rejects the patentee’s offer, it must make a counter-offer on FRAND
terms; and
6. If patentee rejects the counter-offer, the defendant must provide appropriate
security (including for past use) and be able to render an account of its acts of use.
23

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Remarks that the USC Gould School of Law’s
Center for Transnational Law and Business, Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistantattorneygeneral-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center
24
Eur. Court of Justice, Case C-170/13 (2015).
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In the few years since the Huawei decision, a number of cases in Germany and
other jurisdictions have helped to clarify these requirements. In several cases, including
Sisvel v. Haier (Germany 2015), NTT DoCoMo v. HTC (Germany 2016), Saint Lawrence
v. Vodafone (Germany 2016), and Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom (Germany 2016),
the manufacturer/infringer failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in
Huawei v. ZTE. These failures included failing to make a specific counter-offer and
failing to post monetary security against the royalty demand. As a result, the courts in
these cases approved the entry of an injunction against the infringer. In some of these
cases, however (Sisvel v. Haier, St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom), these injunctions
were stayed by appellate courts, which found that the SEP holders themselves may not
have complied with the Huawei procedures. In particular, though lower courts appeared
to allow SEP holders to seek an injunction if their initial offers were not obviously nonFRAND, the appellate courts in Germany required an affirmative finding that the offers
were FRAND in order to support an injunction.

C.

Injunctions in China

The first notable SEP-related case in China was decided in 2013 and involved the
enforcement of patents by InterDigital Corporation (IDC) against Chinese manufacturer
Huawei. IDC was found to have abused its dominant position by demanding an
unreasonably high royalty from Huawei and in enforcing its patents against Huawei both
in China and abroad. The court held that IDC violated the Chinese Antimonopoly Law
(AML) when it sought an injunction against Huawei, which had demonstrated a
willingness to obtain a license on FRAND terms and acted in good faith during the
license negotiation. This case was generally viewed as indicating that Chinese courts
would take a dim view of attempts by SEP holders to seek injunctions against potential
willing licensees.
This general view shifted beginning in 2016 when the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC) released a set of judicial interpretations relating to patent infringement cases.25
Article 24 of the interpretations provides guidance regarding SEPs. In particular, it states
that if a SEP holder deliberately fails to comply with its obligation to grant a FRAND
license to a manufacturer, and the manufacturer is not clearly at fault, then the SEP
holder should not be entitled to an injunction against the manufacturer. There are,
however, several limitations with respect to this interpretation. First, it does not address
the availability of injunctions under other circumstances, such as when both parties
negotiated in good faith, both were acting in bad faith, or the patent holder was acting in
good faith and the implementer was acting in bad faith. Moreover, the interpretation

25
Interpretations (II) of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application
of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (effective as of April 1, 2016), available at
http://www.beijingeastip.com/type-news/interpretation-by-the-supreme-peoples-court-on-some-issuesconcerning-the-application-of-laws-in-the-trial-of-patent-infringement-dispute-cases-ii-judicialinterpretation-2016-no-1-3/.
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appears to relate only to recommended national and industrial standards, without
mentioning compulsory governmental standards or voluntary international standards.
Additional guidelines regarding patent infringement cases were issued by the
Beijing High People’s Court in 2017.26 Articles 149-153 of these guidelines deal with
patents disclosed in recommended national, industrial or local standards. Articles 152153 specifically set forth how injunctive relief should be awarded when neither party is at
fault, or both parties are at fault, during FRAND licensing negotiations. The Beijing
guidelines also provide that if neither party is at fault, the infringer must deposit the
amount of its proposed royalty with the court in order to avoid an injunction.
Article 152 sets forth a list of specific criteria that the court may use to assess
whether the patent holder willfully violated its FRAND obligations, including the
following:
1. failing to notify the accused infringer of the infringement in writing and
failing to specify the scope and manner of infringement;
2. failing to provide patent information or specific licensing conditions in
written form in accordance with business practices and trading customs,
after the accused party explicitly expresses a willingness to engage in
licensing negotiations;
3. failing to provide the accused infringer with a time limit for reply in
accordance with business practices and trading customs;
4. obstructing or interrupting the licensing negotiation without justifiable
reasons;
5. alleging clearly unreasonable conditions during the negotiation, which
results in failure to reach a licensing agreement.
In March 2017, the Beijing IP Court granted an injunction to Chinese patent
holder Iwncomm against Sony’s distribution of wireless handsets that allegedly infringed
patents covering the Chinese WAPI standard for wireless networking. The court found
that Sony acted in bad faith by stretching out licensing negotiations for six years (socalled “reverse hold-up”). Among the factors that weighed against Sony were its
attempted use of comparable licenses based on an international standard (i.e., not the
Chinese standard at issue), and its unwillingness to sign a nondisclosure agreement
before obtaining claim charts from Iwncomm.27
Most recently, in January 2018, the Intermediate People’s Court in Shenzhen
issued an injunction against Samsung’s sale of 4G telecommunications devices that

26

Beijing High People’s Court Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (Apr. 20, 2017)
available at http://www.cpahkltd.com/EN/info.aspx?n=20170424155321600369
27
A claim chart is a document that maps the particular features of a product to the specific patent
claims that are alleged to be infringed. Such charts are often quite detailed.
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allegedly infringed two Huawei patents.28 As in the Iwncomm case, the court appears to
have based its decision, at least in part, on the alleged bad faith behavior of the infringing
party. These cases, coupled with the recent interpretive guidance issued by the Supreme
People’s Court and Beijing High People’s Court, clearly indicates a more permissive
attitude toward injunctions in China.

D.

Private Waivers of Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief is a remedy available to private litigants, and as such may be
waived by sophisticated parties acting without duress or anticompetitive intent. Such
waivers occasionally appear in private contracts between commercial parties.29 Recently,
such waivers have featured prominently in the standard-setting context. As noted in Part
II.A.3 above, Apple, Google and Motorola each voluntarily committed not to seek
injunctions under standards-essential patents in connection with DOJ approval of their
patent-related acquisitions. And in 2015, IEEE approved revisions to its internal policies
to require its members to forego injunctive relief against manufacturers of products
compliant with IEEE standards except in certain limited circumstances. These private
waivers, if reflecting the desires of SDO participants, can effectively eliminate disputes
over the use of injunctions in the SEP context.

III.

FRAND Royalty Disputes

One of the most complex issues arising with respect to FRAND licensing is the
royalty level that complies with a SEP holder’s commitment to grant a license on terms
that are “fair and reasonable”. As noted above, most SDOs offer little guidance regarding
the actual FRAND royalty level. Thus, the determination of FRAND royalty rates is
typically left to bilateral negotiations among SEP holders and manufacturers of
standardized products. Not surprisingly, there is sometimes disagreement whether a
royalty rate is compliant with the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment. In some cases, a
SEP holder and a manufacturer may disagree whether the royalty rate demanded by the
SEP holder for such a license is FRAND, and the manufacturer may sue the SEP holder
for breaching its FRAND commitment. In other cases, a SEP holder may sue a
manufacturer for infringing its SEPs, and the manufacturer may raise as an affirmative
defense the SEP holder’s obligation to grant the manufacturer a license on FRAND
terms. In both of these scenarios, one of the central questions is whether the royalty rate
that the SEP holder sought to charge the manufacturer was FRAND. These questions
have been handled somewhat differently among jurisdictions.

28

At the time of this writing, a translation of the Shenzhen decision is not available. A summary
of the court’s reasoning was reported in Jacob Schindler, Huawei scores SEP injunction in Shenzhen suit
against Samsung Electronics, IAM Blog, Jan. 11, 2018,
29
E.g., Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719(1)(a) permits contracting parties to “provide for
remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article”.

Jorge Contreras

13

Global Standards Wars

A. FRAND Royalties in the U.S. and the Georgia-Pacific Framework
In the U.S., the assessment of damages in most civil cases, including patent and
contract cases, is a question of “fact” reserved to the jury under the Seventh Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. Litigants may waive their right to a jury determination, but only
if both parties agree to do so. As a result, FRAND royalty determinations in U.S. cases
have been a combination of judicial “bench” decisions and jury verdicts.
Under the U.S. Patent Act, the principal measure of damages for patent
infringement is a “reasonable royalty”.30 As a result, several courts that have calculated
FRAND royalty rates have looked to traditional methodologies for determining
reasonable royalty damages. The calculation of reasonable royalty damages in the U.S.
has generally followed the 15-factor framework established in 1970 by Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.31 However, because this framework assumes that the patent
holder and the infringer have no pre-existing relationship, and that the patent holder is not
otherwise constrained in its ability to determine its royalty rate, many of the assumptions
30

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2016) (first enacted in 1952).
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors are:
31

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

The royalties received by the patent holder for licensing the patent, proving or tending to
prove an established royalty.
The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other similar patents.
The nature and scope of the license, whether it is exclusive or nonexclusive, or restricted
or non-restricted in terms of territory or customers.
The patent holder’s established policy of maintaining its patent monopoly by licensing
the use of the invention only under special conditions designed to preserve the monopoly.
The commercial relationship between the patent holder and licensees, such as whether
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business or whether they are
inventor and promoter.
The effect of selling the patented article in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee; the existing value of the invention to the patent holder as a generator of sales of
non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or “convoyed” sales.
The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
The established profitability of the patented product, its commercial success and its
current popularity.
The utility and advantages of the patented technology over any old modes or devices that
had been used for achieving similar results.
The nature of the patented invention, its character in the commercial embodiment owned
and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those who used it.
The extent to which the infringer used the invention and any evidence probative of the
value of that use.
The portion of the profit or selling price that is customary in the particular business or in
comparable businesses.
The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from any non-patented elements, manufacturing process, business risks or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
The amount that the patent holder and a licensee would have agreed upon at the time the
infringement began if they had reasonably and voluntarily tried to reach an agreement.
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underlying the Georgia-Pacific analysis do not apply in cases involving FRANDencumbered SEPs.
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge Robart of the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Washington sought to determine both a reasonable royalty and a
range of reasonable royalties for Motorola’s patents covering two industry standards.32 In
doing so, Judge Robart looked first to the reasonable royalty damages analysis in
Georgia-Pacific, including its hypothetical negotiation framework. He reasoned that the
parties to a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND33 royalty rates by “looking at the
importance of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs
to the products at issue” (p.19). However, he also noted that “[f]rom an economic
perspective, a RAND commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a
reasonable royalty on the economic value of its patented technology itself, apart from the
value associated with incorporation of the patented technology into the standard” (id.)
Ultimately, Judge Robart adopted a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific
framework in which he changed twelve of the fifteen factors to take Motorola’s RAND
commitment into account. After establishing this analytical framework, Judge Robart
looked to several “comparable” sets of license agreements, including some patent pools,
to evaluate the basis for Motorola’s RAND royalty rates.
The RAND royalty rates determined by Judge Robart were significantly lower
than the rates originally demanded by Motorola. For example, with respect to SEPs
covering the H.264 audio-video encoding standard, Motorola initially demanded a royalty
of 2.25% of the end price of Microsoft products embodying the standard. Thus, for a lowend $500 computer, the per-unit royalty would have been $11.25. The court, in assessing
the value of Motorola’s patents to the H.264 standard and the value of the standard to the
overall products in which it was embodied, determined a FRAND royalty rate of
$0.00555 per unit. Based on these results, Motorola’s initial royalty demand to Microsoft
was more than 2,000 times higher than the “reasonable” royalty rate determined by the
court.
In Innovatio IP Ventures, Innovatio, a patent assertion entity (PAE) holding
twenty-three SEPs covering the 802.11 Wi-Fi standards sent demand letters to hundreds
of coffee shops, motels, supermarkets and other retail establishments that offered public
Wi-Fi access (thereby allegedly infringing the SEPs), in each case seeking a modest
monetary settlement.34 The case was consolidated and the court considered Innovatio’s
proposed royalty of 6% of the end price of products such as wireless access points,
laptops, tablets and bar code scanners, resulting in potential royalties ranging from $3.39
to $36.90 per unit (pp. 74-75). In assessing the appropriate RAND royalty rate, Judge
Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois largely followed the framework described
in Microsoft for the determination of RAND royalties. In particular, he applied a
Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233.
Some SDOs use the term RAND in lieu of FRAND. For purposes of this paper, these terms will
be considered to be synonymous.
34
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *38 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
32

33
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modified Georgia-Pacific analysis that simulates a hypothetical bilateral negotiation in
the context of RAND obligations. After assessing the value of Innovatio’s SEPs, the
court held that the appropriate FRAND royalty was only $0.0956 per unit, making
Innovatio’s initial royalty proposals between 35 and 386 times higher than the
adjudicated FRAND royalty rate.
In Ericsson v. D-Link,35 the FRAND royalty rate was determined by a jury. Thus,
the Federal Circuit, on appeal, was limited to reviewing the trial court’s instructions to
the jury. In the appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the jury verdict based,
in part, on the district court’s instruction to apply the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors
without modification. The Federal Circuit affirmed that, “[i]n a case involving RANDencumbered patents, many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not relevant; many
are even contrary to RAND principles”.36 The Federal Circuit noted several respects in
which the Georgia-Pacific factors were both irrelevant and contrary to the RAND
commitment under consideration. Thus, like Judge Robart in Microsoft, the Federal
Circuit criticized the use of several specific Georgia-Pacific factors when considering
royalties subject to RAND commitments.
The Federal Circuit in Ericsson v. D-Link made several other important rulings. In
particular, it held that an accused infringer seeking to raise the issue of hold-up to a jury
must introduce actual evidence of the SEP holder’s hold-up behavior. Because this
evidence was not introduced by the alleged infringer, the court was justified in not
instructing the jury on the question of hold-up.37 The court used similar reasoning with
respect to the question of royalty stacking and held that actual evidence of stacking must
be introduced in order for the question to be considered by the jury.38

B. Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Royalty Determinations
In most of the cases discussed in Part III.A above, the courts determined FRAND
royalties in a “bottom-up” manner. That is, they calculated the royalty due to the patent
holder based primarily on the alleged value of the patents in suit, without regard to the
overall number or value of patents covering the standard in question or the results
reached by other courts addressing the same standards. In fact, as the Federal Circuit
emphasized in Ericsson v. D-Link, a court may not even instruct the jury regarding
royalty stacking without actual evidence of stacking.39 When such bottom-up approaches
are used, royalties due to individual patent holders are determined in an uncoordinated
manner independently of one another, and the total royalty burden associated with a
standard emerges only as the sum of its individual components. The problem with such
35 Ericsson,

Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1230.
37
Id. at 1234.
38
Id. at 1234-35. The author has questioned this analysis and conclusion on the basis that it could
lead SEP holders to engage in a “race to the courthouse” in order to be the first to seek and collect damages
from particular manufacturers. See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Royalty Stacking and Collective Action,
3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 6, Mar. 2015.
39
773 F.3d at 1234-35.
36
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bottom-up approaches is that courts may use different royalty criteria and factors case by
case, even when patents covering the same features of the same standard are involved,
thus yielding inconsistent and potentially excessive results. For example, as shown in
Table 1, in 2013 and 2014, five different U.S. district courts calculated royalties for a
total of 35 SEPs covering IEEE’s Wi-Fi standards.
TABLE 1
U.S. Litigated FRAND Royalty Determinations for 802.11 (Wi-Fi) Standard-Essential Patents
Case
Court (year)40
Royalty
41
Microsoft v. Motorola
W.D. Wash. (2013)
$0.035 per unit
In re Innovatio42
N.D. Ill. (2013)
$0.0956 per unit
Ericsson v. D-Link43
E.D. Tex. (2013)
$0.15 per unit
Realtek v. LSI44
N.D. Cal. (2014)
0.12% of net sales
CSIRO v. Cisco45
E.D. Tex. (2014)
Up to $1.90 per unit
Source: Jason R. Bartlett and Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader
Save the Internet of Things, 36 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 285, 288 (2017).

The aggregate royalty for these 35 SEPs amounted to approximately 4.5% of the
total sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router. Yet it has been estimated that there are
approximately 3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi standard. If the royalty for each of these
patents were calculated in a similarly uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate
patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could easily surpass the product’s total selling price by at
least an order of magnitude. And even if, as suggested by some commentators, this effect
might be reduced because many of these SEPs are held by the same large firms,46 the total
number of firms holding SEPs covering Wi-Fi is still significantly larger than the number
of adjudicated cases to date.
Given the growing recognition of these issues, commentators, courts and policy
makers have become increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the
aggregate royalty burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties owed
to any particular patent holder. Thus, as noted by the European Commission in a recent
communication regarding SEPs, “an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation.
Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing

40
Cited decisions are to the federal district court decision in which the royalty was determined.
Subsequent proceedings and appeals are not listed.
41
Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *297–98.
42
No. 1:11CV-09308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *183 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013)..
43
Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 6:10-CV-473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110585 at *72 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part by Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
44
Jury Verdict Form, Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp. & Agere Sys., LLC, No. 12-CV3451, Dkt. No. 324 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014).
45
CSIRO v. Cisco Sys., No. 6:11-cv-343, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107612, at *51 (E.D. Tex. July
23, 2014).
46
See Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, An Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Decision
in Ericsson v. D-Link, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 6, Mar. 2015.
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the overall added value of the technology.”47 Royalty calculation methodologies that seek
to address these issues can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they look
first to the overall level of royalties associated with a standard and then allocate a portion
of this total to individual patent holders.48 Top-down approaches implicitly recognize
that, when multiple patents cover a single standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder
will necessarily affect the rates that the other SEP holders are able to obtain from a single
manufacturer. Top-down royalty approaches offer the following advantages to the parties
and to the market as a whole:
•
•
•
•

Accuracy – the total value attributable to a standard is computed deliberately,
not through the uncoordinated aggregation of independent, serial cases
Fairness to patentees – every patent holder obtains its fair share of the total
royalty attributable to the standard
Fairness to licensees – licensees are not subject to royalty stacking with
multiple suits by different patent holders
Precedent – aggregate royalties are already calculated in patent pools and this
methodology is well-understood

The court in Innovatio was among the earliest to adopt a top-down methodology
to calculate FRAND royalties. It first determined, based on expert testimony, that the
average profit margin on the sale of a Wi-Fi chip during the relevant period was 12.1%. It
then multiplied this percentage by the average price of a Wi-Fi chip ($14.85), yielding an
average total profit of $1.80 per chip. The court reasoned that a chip manufacturer would
spend no more than its total profit on patent royalties, and therefor equated the aggregate
royalty for all Wi-Fi SEPs to the chip maker’s total profit. It thus held that the aggregate
per-product royalty attributable to the Wi-Fi standard should be $1.80, and then
apportioned a fraction of this total to the plaintiff.49
In Samsung v. Apple Japan50, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court held
that the aggregate royalty burden for the 3G UMTS standard should not exceed 5%. It
then allocated a portion of this total royalty to Samsung’s asserted UMTS-essential patent
based on the total number of SEPs likely to be essential to the standard. Unlike the court
in Innovatio, the Japanese court relied on public statements and informal agreements
among industry participants supporting an aggregate 5% royalty cap for the UMTS
standard. Taking this evidence into account, the court reasoned that “many owners of the
UMTS standard essential patents support the 5% aggregate royalty cap with a view to
preventing the aggregate cap from being excessively high.”

47

European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee Setting out the EU approach to Standard
Essential Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712 final.
48
For a more detailed discussion of Top-Down approaches, see Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated
Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62(4) ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 690-709 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051502
49
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *83.
50
Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., IP High Court of Japan, 2013 (Ne)
10043 (May 16, 2014).
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Likewise, the UK High Court (Patent) in Unwired Planet v. Huawei51 applied a
top-down methodology to calculate FRAND royalties due to the SEP holder. Under the
top down methodology used by the court, the FRAND royalty equals T x S, where T is
the total aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (i.e., the
percentage of a smartphone’s price that should be charged for all patents covering the
standard), and S is the share of that aggregate royalty that is allocable to the SEP holder
(Unwired Planet). To calculate “T”, the court considered eight public statements made
by Ericsson (the original owner of the patents asserted by Unwired Planet) and other
holders of SEPs covering the relevant standards. He then calculated “S”, Unwired
Planet’s share of the relevant SEP value, using a variety of counting and filtering
methodologies proposed by the parties’ experts, including a filter for the likely
essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio. The court used the resulting royalty
rate as a cross-check to verify a more traditional comparables-based royalty calculation
methodology.52
And most recently, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in
TCL v. Ericsson53 used a top-down approach to assess FRAND royalties for a portfolio of
patents covering the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards. Like the
courts in Unwired Planet and Apple Japan, the California court based the aggregate rates
for these standards on various public statements and press releases made by Ericsson.
These statements supported an aggregate royalty of 5% on the 2G and 3G standards and a
rate between 6% and 10% on the 4G standard.54 While the court acknowledges that this
method “is not perfect”,55 one of its merits is its dependence on statements made by
Ericsson itself to induce the market to adopt standards covered by its own SEPs.56 The
court’s endorsement of a top-down royalty calculation methodology in this case,
following the similar endorsements in Japan and the UK, may suggest that top-down
methodologies are gaining ground on the “hypothetical negotiation” approaches
discussed in Part III.A above

51

[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017).
The court in Unwired Planet offers two possible methods of calculating the FRAND royalty,
one based on an analysis of comparable license rates, the other based on a top-down approach. In the
comparables comparison, the fact that Unwired Planet obtained each of its asserted SEPs from Ericsson
was convincing proof that Ericsson’s licenses qualified as sufficiently comparable, while most other
licenses (i.e., those not involving Ericsson) were found not to be suitable comparables. After identifying an
appropriate set of comparable licenses, the court reasons that the appropriate FRAND royalty rate for
Unwired Planet’s SEP portfolio was the rate charged by Ericsson for its own SEP portfolio, scaled to
represent Unwired Planet’s smaller number of patents.
53
TCL Communications v. Ericsson, Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(C.D. Cal., Dec. 21, 2017, SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx) and CV 15-2370 JVS (DFMx)).
54
Id. at *19-26.
55
Id. at *25.
56
Id. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other
Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479 (2015) (discussing inducement and “market reliance” on FRAND
commitments).
52
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C. Competition versus Contractual Approaches: Unwired Planet
In Unwired Planet v. Huawei,57Justice Colin Birss of the UK High Court (Patents)
made several important observations and rulings tied to EU competition law principles.
First, Justice Birss rules, as a matter of law, that there is a single royalty rate that qualifies
as FRAND for any given set of SEPs and products. This approach runs counter to the
FRAND range computed in U.S. cases such as Microsoft v. Motorola. This being said,
he also concludes that it would not be an abuse of dominance under TFEU 102 or the
CJEU’s holding in Huawei v. ZTE for a SEP holder to offer a rate that is different from
the precise FRAND rate, so long as it is not excessively so. That is, an abuse of
dominance will not be found unless an offer “is so far above FRAND as to act to disrupt or
prejudice the negotiations themselves”.58
Justice Birss also addresses the behavior of the potential licensee in FRAND
negotiations. If the licensee engages in deliberate delay tactics or other unreasonable
behavior to avoid entering into a license (hold-out or reverse hold-up), it is less likely that
the SEP holder will be found to possess a dominant position for competition law
purposes.59

D. Global Licenses and FRAND Rates
In Unwired Planet, Unwired Planet offered Huawei a worldwide license under its
asserted SEPs. Huawei responded that it only wished to negotiate a license under
Unwired Planet’s UK patents. In evaluating the reasonableness of Unwired Planet’s
worldwide license offer, Justice Birss observed that “the vast majority” of SEP licenses in
the industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at trial, were granted on
a worldwide basis. He then observed that Unwired Planet’s patents were issued in fortytwo countries, while Huawei’s operations extended to fifty-one countries. Against this
backdrop, he concluded that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing
basis would agree on a worldwide licence”.60 In contrast, country-by-country licensing
would be “madness”,61 and that Huawei’s insistence on a UK-only license could not be
considered FRAND. Accordingly, the court ruled that, under these facts, a FRAND
license is necessarily a worldwide license.
The global scope of the license determined in Unwired Planet invites national
courts to set royalty rates for SEPs across the globe.62 Will the first court to hear a
particular case now try to resolve the worldwide dispute between the parties? Will the
57

[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017).
Id. at ¶765.
59
Id. at ¶806(12).
60
Id. at ¶543.
61
Id. at ¶544.
62
These issues are discussed in greater detail in Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition
and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 16 ANTITRUST SOURCE,
August, 2017.
58

Jorge Contreras

20

Global Standards Wars

FRAND rates set by a particular national court be respected by courts in other
jurisdictions evaluating damages claims for past infringement, or will each national court
feel compelled to conduct its own FRAND royalty calculation? It is possible that the
willingness of judges in particular jurisdictions to set favorable (high) worldwide
FRAND rates will begin to attract patent holders to those jurisdictions, much as U.S.
patent holders were once attracted to the patent-friendly District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.63 By the same token, jurisdictions that gain reputations for setting
unfavorable (low) FRAND rates may attract implementers to their courts. Will a new
“race to the bottom” thus emerge, in which litigants seek out the national courts most
likely to produce judgments in their favor?64 These issues will need to be addressed
internationally and, ideally, in a coordinated fashion in the near future.

IV.

Non-Discrimination

The non-discrimination (ND) prong of the FRAND commitment is important, but
has received far less attention from courts and commentators than royalty disputes. The
most thorough recent discussions of non-discrimination appears in Unwired Planet v.
Huawei and TCL v. Ericsson.

A.

Similarly-Situated Licensees

There is a general consensus that in order to comply with the non-discrimination
prong of the FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat “similarly situated” licensees
in a similar manner.65 Several commentators have understood this constraint to allow a
SEP holder to charge different royalty rates to implementers based on their size or market
share (often with the understanding that larger players are likely to sell more licensed
products and thus pay higher levels of royalties). In Unwired Planet, the court reasons
that a FRAND royalty rate should be set based on the value of the licensed patents, not on
the size of other characteristics of the licensee (¶ 175). Thus, “all licensees who need the
same kind of licence will be charged the same kind of rate” (id.) and “[s]mall new entrants
are entitled to pay a royalty based on the same benchmark as established large entities” (¶
806(8)).
Likewise, in TCL v. Ericsson, Judge Selna concludes that similarly situated firms
are “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market” [for telecommunications

63

The reign of the E.D.Tex. may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. __ (2017).
64
See Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 16 ANTITRUST SOURCE, August, 2017 (discussing the
implications of global FRAND resolution in a single court).
65
For a detailed discussion of the non-discrimination prong of FRAND, see Jorge L. Contreras &
Anne Layne-Farrar, Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, Ch. 12 (Jorge L.
Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017).
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products].66 The court expressly excludes from this group “local kings” – firms that sell
most of their products in a single country (e.g., India’s Karbonn and China’s Coolpad).67
The firms that the court finds to be similarly situated to TCL are Apple, Samsung,
Huawei, LG, HTC and ZTE.68 Ericsson argued that Apple and Samsung are not similar to
TCL given their greater market shares and brand recognition, but the court rejects this
argument, reasoning that “the prohibition on discrimination would mean very little if the
largest, most profitable firms could always be a category unto themselves simply because
they were the largest and most profitable firms”.69

B.

Hard-Edged Non-Discrimination

In Unwired Planet, Justice Birss next asks what happens if, after a FRAND rate is
agreed between a SEP holder and an implementer, the implementer discovers that the
SEP holder has, previously or subsequently, granted more favorable terms (i.e., a lower
royalty rate) to another “similarly situated” implementer? Has the SEP holder violated its
nondiscrimination commitment? Interestingly, the court rules that a SEP licensee cannot
challenge a license granted to it on FRAND terms if it later discovers that a similarlysituated licensee is paying a lower rate for the same patents unless the difference would
“distort competition” between the two licensees. 70 In reaching this conclusion, the court
rejects the notion that the ND prong of FRAND implies a “hard-edged” obligation that
places an absolute ceiling on the rate that a SEP holder may charge to other licensees. It
justifies this reasoning under competition law principles, noting that a competition law
violation would not occur without a competitive distortion. This reasoning seemingly
conflates the competition law effects of violating a FRAND commitment, and the private
“contractual” meaning of the FRAND commitment itself. Whether other courts will
adopt this competition-based reasoning remains to be seen.
Perhaps following the UK court’s lead, in TCL v. Ericsson, Ericsson argued that
in order for an instance of discrimination to violate its FRAND commitment, the
discrimination must have the effect of “impairing the development of standards”.71 But
Judge Selna takes a different view, holding that discrimination in violation of a FRAND
commitment can be found so long as an individual firm is harmed. He expressly rejects
the application of a competition-based standard, which requires harm to competition
rather than harm to a competitor, to the analysis of a FRAND commitment.72 In this
respect, courts in the UK and U.S. have diverged. Given that both the Unwired Planet
and TCL decisions have been appealed, it remains to be seen whether this trans-Atlantic
gap will continue.
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C.

Level Discrimination

In addition to the questions addressed in these cases, there are several additional
issues concerning the non-discrimination prong of FRAND. One of the most hotly
debated of these is whether a FRAND commitment requires a SEP holder to license all
applicants, or whether SEP holders may refuse to license certain categories of potential
licensees (usually “upstream” component vendors) so that they may instead license other
categories of licensees (usually “downstream” product vendors that purchase components
from upstream vendors). This approach is largely motivated by the doctrine of patent
exhaustion, under which a patent holder may collect a royalty only once per patented
article. Thus, if a standardized technology is implemented in a chip, the SEP holder may
collect a royalty either from the manufacturer of the chip, the assembler of the board on
which the chip resides, the producer of the smartphone in which the board is installed or
the user of the smart phone that utilizes the chip. But it cannot collect royalties from
more than one of these parties in the supply chain. The SEP is “exhausted” once a
product is sold by an authorized licensee, and the SEP holder cannot collect royalties
from further downstream users of the patented technology.73
There is thus a significant debate regarding the ability of SEP holders, under their
FRAND commitments, to refuse to grant licenses to upstream component manufacturers
who seek SEP licenses. Courts and commentators are divided on this issue. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Microsoft v. Motorola that a SEP holder, in
its declarations to the ITU, promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted number of
applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis”.74 This statement implies that such
level discrimination is not permissible. Likewise, in a 2016 remedial order against
Qualcomm, the Korean Fair Trade Commission required that Qualcomm grant FRAND
licenses under its SEPs to any component manufacturer requesting one.75 A similar
commitment to universal access was adopted by the IEEE in recent amendments to its
intellectual property policy.76
But others have argued that the “non-discrimination” prong of FRAND does not
require SEP holders to offer licenses to every applicant, but only to avoid discrimination
73
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within the class of applicants that the SEP holder chooses to license. SEP holders who
refuse to license component vendors have argued that by instead licensing such
component vendors’ downstream customers, they have, in effect, “indirectly licensed”
the component vendors, and that refusing to the license component vendors does not
discriminate against competitors.77 In other words, so long as no component vendors
receive licenses, no one component maker is placed at a competitive disadvantage. This
approach was seemingly validated by the district court in Ericsson v. D-Link, which held
that Ericsson did not violate its non-discrimination covenant by offering licenses only to
vendors of “fully compliant” products and refusing to license chip and component
vendors.78

V. Global Competition Enforcement and Guidance
In addition to the private litigation discussed above, antitrust and competition
authorities around the world have actively been issuing guidance regarding SEP licensing
and enforcement and bringing enforcement actions to remedy suspected abuses connected
with the licensing of SEPs.79

A. India
In India, Ericsson has since 2011 been engaged in a series of SEP infringement
actions against Indian and Chinese manufacturers of mobile communication devices.
Courts hearing these cases have awarded damages and, in some cases, injunctive relief
against these manufacturers. In response to these actions, several of the alleged
infringers filed complaints with the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging,
inter alia, that by bringing these infringement actions, Ericsson abused a dominant
position created by its SEPs. As of this writing, no substantive ruling has been made as
to these issues.

B. China
There are a number of regulatory and enforcement bodies in China with an active
interest in standardization: the Standards Administration of China (SAC), which serves as
China’s principal standard-setting body, the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce (SAIC), which has promulgated regulations on abuse of dominance in the IPR
field under China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML),80 and the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC), which has responsibility for enforcement of the AML.
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In 2013, NDRC initiated an investigation of InterDigital Corporation’s (IDC)
practices regarding SEP licensing, following litigation between IDC and Huawei. IDC
was alleged to discriminate in its licensing practices against Chinese manufacturers and
otherwise abuse its dominant position. The investigation was resolved in 2014 with
IDC’s commitment to discontinue various challenged practices.
In 2013, NDRC also initiated an investigation of Qualcomm
dominance, including discriminatory and excessive SEP pricing, and
bundling of SEPs and non-SEPs. In 2015 NDRC imposed a fine on
approximately US$975 million and also ordered Qualcomm to
anticompetitive practices in China.

for abuse of
impermissible
Qualcomm of
cease certain

C. Korea
The Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has been active in monitoring and
regulating SEP licensing in Korea for several years. In 2014, the KFTC issued Amended
Guidelines Regarding the Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (effective 23
Mar 2016), which established several categories of suspect activity pertaining to SEPs.
Potential abuses by SEP holders include seeking injunctive relief against a willing
licensee and unreasonably refusing to license on FRAND terms. The Guidelines also
focus on conduct by non-practicing entities (NPEs). With regard to SEPs, potential
abuses by NPEs include imposing excessive licensing fees, refusing to honor prior
FRAND commitments on SEPs and “privateering” (acquiring SEPs from operating
companies for the purpose of enforcing them against others, while the operating
companies retain some financial interest in the outcome of the enforcement).
The KFTC has also brought two major enforcement actions relating to SEP
licensing against Qualcomm. The first, in 2009, resulted in a fine of approximately
US$208 million for allegedly overcharging chip customers for software code. The
second action, which concluded in 2016, involved allegations that Qualcomm refused to
license chip manufacturers in violation of its FRAND obligations, engaged in unfair
licensing practices relating to its SEPs, and unfairly demanded royalty-free grant-back
licenses from its licensees. The action resulted in a fine against Qualcomm of
approximately US$853 million.81

D. Taiwan
The most recent enforcement action against Qualcomm to result in a significant
penalty was brought by the Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission. It imposed a fine of
approximately US$774 million against Qualcomm for allegedly exercising a monopoly
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position in the market for wireless chips, licensing its technology in violation of antitrust
law, and harming competition through its overall business model.

E. Japan
Agencies in Japan have been particularly active in developing policies around
SEPs and FRAND licensing. In January 2016, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
amended its 2007 guidelines interpreting how the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) applies to
intellectual property.82 The amended guidelines contain significant discussion of SEPs,
particularly pointing out that a SEP holder likely violates the AMA if it refuses to grant a
license, or seeks an injunction against, a “willing licensee”. Moreover, the guidelines
define a willing licensee as any entity that pursues "licensing negotiations in good faith in
light of the normal business practices", even if that entity has challenged the patent’s
validity, infringement or essentiality.
The Japan Patent Office (JPO) has also been active in developing policy around
SEPs. In March 2018, the JPO published a draft “Guide to Licensing Negotiations
involving Standard Essential Patents”. 83 The comprehensive document outlines the
processes and procedures that the JPO identifies as constituting “good faith” negotiation
over FRAND licensing. In addition, the JPO has announced that it will expand its
existing “Hantei” service, in which the JPO offers advisory opinions regarding the
coverage of specified products by Japanese patents, to assess whether specified standards
may be covered by Japanese patents. 84

F. European Union
The European Commission has initiated a number of investigations and actions
with respect to suspected violations of EU competition law in connection with standardsetting and SEP licensing and enforcement. These include past investigations of
Samsung, Rambus and Qualcomm.85 In January 2018, the Commission imposed a fine of
approximately $1.2 billion (EUR 997 million) on Qualcomm for making payments to a
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large customer (Apple) in exchange for its agreement not to purchase baseband chips
from Qualcomm’s rivals.86
In November 2017, the European Commission issued a long-awaited
Communication regarding SEPs. 87 The Communication was issued in response to a
general concern within Europe regarding the suitability of existing legal and regulatory
frameworks to handle the growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G wireless
communications. The Communication covers four general areas: transparency of SDO
SEP disclosures, FRAND licensing, injunctions and open source code.
With respect to transparency, the Commission makes several suggestions
regarding improvements to SDO SEP disclosure databases, including enhancing
accuracy, detail and searchability of the SEP information that is currently housed in SDO
databases. The Commission also responded to frequent criticism of over-declaration of
SEPs in SDO databases by suggesting that the essentiality of SEPs be verified through an
independent third party. This suggestion has been met with some skepticism in the
industry, as the cost of such validation would likely be significant, and no clear model for
addressing such cost has been proposed.
With respect to FRAND royalties, the Commission emphasized that licensing
terms should bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology,
and that this value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is
unrelated to the patented technology. Moreover, as noted above,88 the Commission noted
that the value of an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation, and that parties
must take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall
added value of the technology. The Communication also briefly discusses the nondiscrimination prong of FRAND and confirms that cross-licensing requirements and
patent pools, in certain industries, should be acceptable.
In terms of enforcement and injunctive relief, the Commission acknowledges the
binding effect of the ECJ’s decision in Huawei v. ZTE as well as the proportionality
principle established under Article 3(2) of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive89 (specifically
“the requirement to ensure that injunctive relief is effective, proportionate and
dissuasive”). It appears that the Commission, by referencing “the broad impact an
injunction may have on businesses, consumers and on the public interest” may be
attempting to introduce a “public interest” element to European injunctive relief
decisions, along the lines of the public interest factor under the U.S. eBay framework.90 In
addition, the Communication clarifies that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an
86
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appropriate means for resolving FRAND disputes, and that no special rules should be
applied to the assertion of SEPs by non-practicing entities.
The Communication concludes with a brief discussion of the interaction between
SDO processes and open source code community projects, and seeks to encourage further
collaboration between these two communities.

G. United States
The U.S. FTC has initiated a number of competition-based enforcement actions
relating to SEP licensing. These have included actions against Dell, Rambus, Negotiated
Data Solutions (N-Data), Unocal, Bosch and Google/Motorola.91 Most recently, in late
2016, the FTC brought suit against Qualcomm in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California92 alleging, among other things, that Qualcomm violated the antitrust
laws by linking the sale of its baseband chips to SEP licenses, that it refused to license
rival chipmakers under its SEPs, and that an exclusive arrangement with a major
customer was intended to foreclose competition and market entry. FTC Commissioner
Maureen Ohlhausen filed a dissenting statement objecting to the initiation of the suit.93
The case was still at an early stage as of this writing.
Given that the principal U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies are led by political
appointees, it is not uncommon for the priorities of these agencies to change when
administrations change. Such a change appears to be under way at the U.S. Department
of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ). Whereas, as noted above, the U.S. FTC continues to
pursue allegedly anticompetitive conduct in the standard-setting arena, and the DOJ has
previously taken an active role in policing potentially abusive conduct by SEP holders, a
recent speech by Makan Delrahim, the new Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division,94 indicates that unilateral conduct by SEP holders may no longer be an
enforcement priority of the current administration. Rather, he suggests that greater
scrutiny may be leveled at SDOs and implementers acting collectively. In particular,
concerted actions such as the amendment of SDO policies in a manner that is unfavorable
to SEP holders may warrant particular scrutiny. The full implications of this potential
policy shift at DOJ remain to be seen. Interestingly, at least one FTC Commissioner has
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issued what appears to be a response to AAG Delrahim, reaffirming the need for federal
agencies to police patent hold-up and other anticompetitive unilateral conduct.95

Conclusion
Disputes over standards-essential patents have become global, often involving
simultaneous litigation in North America, Europe and Asia. But while many of the parties
are the same in actions around the world, courts and governmental agencies in different
jurisdictions have begun to develop distinctive approaches to some of these issues. Thus,
while areas of convergence exist, national laws continue to diverge on important issues
such as the availability of injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs, the appropriate
method for calculating FRAND royalties, the competition implications of violating a
FRAND commitment, and the contours of the FRAND non-discrimination obligation.
International harmonization, while a worthy long term goal, does not appear to be on the
immediate horizon. Accordingly, firms doing business globally must remain attuned to
the diverse legal landscape in this area. Likewise, policy makers and courts should
continue to consider solutions that limit the potential for forum shopping among
jurisdictions and a jurisdictional “race to the bottom”.
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Further Reading
As noted at the outset, most of the issues discussed in this paper are addressed in
greater detail in other work. Below are a few recommended resources that offer
additional information in these areas.

Books
JORGE L. CONTRERAS, ED. CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION
LAW: VOL 1 - COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS (Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-technicalstandardization-law/0EC1655CDF81AF05BF8726C0904C3362
This comprehensive reference work addresses the full range of patent and
competition law issues arising from technical standardization. Chapters are
contributed by leading scholars and practitioners around the world. Many of the
cases and actions discussed in this paper are addressed in substantially greater detail
in this book.
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 46-47 (Keith
Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18510/patentchallenges-for-standard-setting-in-the-global-economy-lessons
This authoritative report by the U.S. National Academies of Science (NAS)
discusses many of the issues and controversies surrounding patenting and standards
around the world.
COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
PATENT POLICY MANUAL, App. A (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007)
This practical manual offers a detailed analysis of common clauses found in the
policies of many leading standards-development organizations, with explanations of
text and alternatives.
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999).
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This now classic book explains the business and economic logic behind
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Chapters and Articles
Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and
Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical
Approaches), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, VOL. II – ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz, eds., Edward
Elgar: 2018, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2900540
This comprehensive literature review summarizes much of the academic literature
concerning standardization and intellectual property, with a focus on empirical
studies.
Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A Practical Guide to Patent Policies of
Standards Development Organizations, 67(6) STANDARDS ENGINEERING 1 (2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699615
This short piece offers a practical explanation of SDO patent policies for business
managers.

Journals
SSRN LAW, POLICY AND ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION EJOURNAL (Jorge
L. Contreras, ed.)
This eJournal, which has been distributed since 2013, offers a range of articles and
papers relating to the law, policy and economics of technical standardization. More
than 600 articles are contained in its freely-accessible online archive at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&jo
urnal_id=2200736. Users with institutional subscriptions to SSRN may subscribe to
this journal without additional charge.
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